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Key points
1. A great majority of Russians declare that they are members of the Orthodox 
Church. However, an analysis of social behaviours has proven that religion 
has no major impact on their lives – a great number of Russian citizens are 
not familiar with the religious dogmas, do not engage themselves in church 
rituals and have a liberal approach to following Christian moral principles. 
Attachment to Orthodoxy in the case of most Russians is of a declarative 
and passive nature, and usually is not linked to taking any specific actions. 
On the other hand, Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow 
Patriarchate, which is the largest religious community in Russia, play an 
essential role in the process of cultural and civil self-identification of the 
Russian nation. The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a socio-political 
institution with a centuries-old history, which places strong emphasis on 
the continuity of Russian statehood and enjoys public prestige in Russia, has 
also been used for political purposes.
2. The ROC’s increasing presence in Russia’s public life seen over the past few 
years is to a great extent a result of Russian government policy, which has 
become more attentive to religion since Vladimir Putin regained the presi-
dency in 2012. To strengthen the political regime in Russia, the Kremlin at 
that time began to draw extensively upon conservative ideology and pro-
mote traditional moral and social values, which the Church is viewed as the 
guardian of. This has resulted in establishing closer relations between the 
secular government and the ROC, as well as in a greater engagement of ROC 
hierarchs and its structures n domestic and foreign policy issues.
3. Relations between the ROC and the government in Russia allude to the Byzan-
tine model of the ‘altar and throne alliance’. This co-operation guarantees 
tangible benefits to both parties: owing to this, the ROC has a privileged 
position as compared to other churches operating in Russia and has been 
granted access to various social groups and sources of financing. All this 
has allowed it to improve its infrastructural and financial potential. In turn, 
the Kremlin has gained a valuable ideological partner. However, co-oper-
ation with a government which demonstrates distrust of any independent 
public initiatives imposes significant limitations on the ROC activities and 
does harm to its image to a certain extent. The Church has been unable to 
reach some of its goals (for example, Orthodox catechisation has not been 
introduced in schools on a compulsory basis) and to pursue its own policy 
in various areas, if its goal collides with the Kremlin’s policy (for example, 
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historic policy which clearly condemn the Soviet regime). Furthermore, the 
ROC’s subordination to the Kremlin has been criticised by some of its follow-
ers in Russia, above all Christian intelligentsia circles who have identified 
themselves with the ROC so far, and has exposed it to the risk of reputational 
damage outside Russia, especially in Ukraine, which this Church sees as 
part of the international area where it would like to hold supremacy.
4. Given its close links with the government, which have been successively 
strengthened since the 1990s, the Orthodox Church’s autonomy in Russia 
tends to be narrower. In effect, the Russian public views the ROC as an 
element of the system of political power, and not as a neutral religious in-
stitution. In the longer term, the increasing integration of ROC hierarchs 
with political establishment will expose the Church to risks related to the 
potential destabilisation of the political system in Russia. These risks have 
recently been augmented by economic problems and increasing tension 
among the general public resulting from the deterioration of the socio-
-political situation.
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intRoduction
In the Soviet period, the government forced citizens to become atheists and sys-
tematically eradicated Orthodox culture from public life. The activity of religious 
organisations was limited and subordinated to the state’s political goals, and their 
structures were infiltrated by the secret services. The Russian Orthodox Church1, 
being the largest religious organisation, experienced brutal repression. During 
those few decades, a significant part of church infrastructure was destroyed or 
nationalised, and the number of people who openly declared themselves as Ortho-
dox Christians fell dramatically as a consequence of persecution, including physi-
cal liquidation of clergymen and lay members of the Church. As a result, the ROC’s 
position in society became marginalised, which additionally contributed to the 
liberalisation of moral standards among the public. It was only Perestroika policy, 
which was initiated by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, that inaugu-
rated a breakthrough in Soviet government policy and caused a gradual revival of 
religious life inside the ROC. The Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church was 
convened again in 1988, new saints were canonised and a festive celebration of the 
1000th anniversary of the of the Christianisation of Rus’ was organised.
When the USSR collapsed, the post-Soviet public faced an identity crisis as 
a consequence firstly of the spiritual impoverishment caused by the state’s 
atheist indoctrination and secondly of the ideological crisis resulting from the 
discrediting of communism. In the new political reality, the Church, being an 
religious and social institution with long history which managed to survive 
the Soviet period preserving the remains of its moral prestige intact despite 
the severe repression, could offer spiritual support to the public and thus re-
build its social position. Over time, the Russian public opinion’s interest in the 
Orthodox religion reached such a scale that this phenomenon has begun to be 
called ‘religious revival’. The ROC’s increasing popularity has not been impaired 
by the fact that the Church had not came to terms with the past of those of its 
hierarchs who had collaborated with Soviet secret services2. The behaviour of 
a number of Russian politicians, who started building their political careers 
1 The word ‘Church’ used throughout this text means the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow 
Patriarchate. The Russian Orthodox Church is also abbreviated in this text as ROC. 
2 For example, Gleb Yakunin, an Orthodox priest, a dissident who wanted cases of the 
Church’s collaboration with the Soviet government to be revealed, has informed about such 
hierarchs. According to media reports, collected among others by the portal compromat.ru, 
the incumbent Patriarch Kirill and his predecessor Alexy, were among those who collabo-
rated with the Soviet secret services. For more information, see http://www.compromat.
ru/page_32401.htm
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in the reality of the Soviet system being engaged in combating Orthodoxy and 
who ostentatiously show off their loyalty to the Church today, like Gennady 
Zyuganov, the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, does 
not provoke dissonance among the Russian public either3.
The Russian government, counting on political benefits, has also looked favour-
ably upon religious revival. It backed the ROC and initially afforded it a great 
degree of freedom of action. Good relations with the Kremlin have made it pos-
sible for the ROC to gain a privileged position among other religious groups in 
Russia, to successfully lobby for legislative changes favourable to itself, and to 
gain sponsors and succeed in its efforts to reach various social groups4. Gradu-
ally, the Church as an institution became an active participant of socio-political 
processes in Russia and an actor in Russian foreign policy. However, the ulti-
mate ground rules for co-operation between ‘the altar and the throne’5 were es-
tablished after 2009, under the influence of two factors. Firstly, the election 
of the resourceful and charismatic Metropolitan Kirill (secular name Vladimir 
Mikhailovich Gundyayev) as leader of the ROC, who had previously served as 
the head of the ROC’s department for external contacts, had rich diplomatic 
experience and showed political ambitions. secondly, the return of Vladimir 
Putin to the presidency in 2012. Putin, looking for a way to consolidate the public 
and prevent unrest among the elites, began to draw upon conservative ideology6. 
On the present government’s initiative, the Church has become an ideological 
pillar of the authoritarian system and an instrument for influencing the public.
This paper is an attempt to answer the question as to what role Orthodoxy and 
the Russian Orthodox Church play in society and politics in Russia today. Its 
goal is to analyse the current position of the ROC as an institution engaged 
in socio-political processes in Russia. This analysis is focused on the period 
since the election of the new head of the ROC, Kirill Patriarch of Moscow and 
All Rus’, i.e. 2009, until the present day.
3 In September 2014, Patriarch Kirill awarded Zyuganov with a prestigious Church award, 
the Order of Glory and Honour, 3rd degree. 
4 For more information on this subject see publications by N. Mitrokhin, for example, Russ-
kaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov: sovremennoye sostoyaniye i aktualnyie problemy, 2006, NLO.
5 In the Byzantine Empire, religion was a consolidating factor of the state, and the Church 
was its pillar. Thus the state government was gaining  sacral dimension. 
6 For more information on the Kremlin’s conservative project see: Witold Rodkiewicz, Jad-
wiga Rogoża, Potemkin conservatism. An ideological tool of the Kremlin, OSW Point of View, 
3 February 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potemkin-
conservatism-ideological-tool-kremlin
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i. the social position oF oRthodoxy  
and the Russian oRthodox chuRch in Russia
The Russian public’s approach to Orthodoxy can be characterised as passive, 
since their declared attachment to religion in most cases does not entail cul-
tivation of religious practices or observing the moral standards promoted 
by the Church in everyday life. The majority of the Russian public view Or-
thodoxy as an element of their cultural and national identity rather than 
a strictly religious one. The Orthodox religion thus becomes a nation-building 
factor – it helps Russian people be distinct from other religious and cultural 
communities, and be aware of the fact that they are part of a single nation-
al or even civilisational community. In turn, the institution of the Russian 
Ortho dox Church is viewed as an element of the Russian state system which 
has formed over centuries; and this guarantees it widespread respect. Such 
superficial attachment to Orthodoxy, where religious and moral issues are 
not really taken into account, nevertheless creates a perfect opportunity for 
the government to utilise this religion for political purposes to consolidate 
the political regime. Naturally, the ROC is the primary, valuable institutional 
partner for the Kremlin in achieving this goal.
1. orthodoxy as viewed by Russians
The number of people who declare themselves as Orthodox has significantly 
increased in Russia over the past two decades. In 1989, 75% of the population 
declared themselves as atheists, and only 17% identified themselves with Ortho-
doxy. The proportion became quite the reverse 25 years later: a definite majority 
of the Russian public (68%) declared their attachment to Orthodoxy, and only 
19% viewed themselves as atheists. The ROC itself has refrained from revealing 
the data concerning the number of people engaged in the life of the religious 
community. It refers to the data from public opinion polls concerning declared 
attachment to the Orthodox religion, not membership of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, which allows it to assume the role of the predominant Church in Russia 
and to make public statements on behalf of the ‘Orthodox majority’.
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The proportions of answers given to the question: Do you view yourself 
as a religious person? If so, which religion are you a follower of?7
answer % 1989 1991 1996 2002 2007 2011 2013
Orthodoxy 17 37 50 56 60 69 68
Islam <1 <1 <1 4 4 5 7
Catholicism <1 – – <1 <1 <1 1
Protestantism – – <1 <1 1 <1 1
Judaism – 1 4 <1 <1 <1 <1
Other 1 <1 1 1 1 1 <1
I am not a religious person 75 53 37 32 29 22 19
I am not sure 7 9 8 6 4 4 4
These data indicate that Russians manifest a high level of declared attachment to 
Orthodoxy. On the other hand, it may be concluded on the basis of public opinion 
polls that the real level of religiousness among the residents of Russia is very low. As 
Russians themselves admit, religion does not play an essential role in their lives – 
43% of respondents say that it is not important, 19% that it has no meaning at all, and 
34% that it is important8. Only 8% of the population take part in religious rituals on 
a regular basis (5% – at least once a week, and 3% two to three times a month)9. Over 
60% of all Russians admit that they have not read the Bible10. Furthermore, only 6% 
of the respondents who declare attachment to Orthodoxy state that they receive 
Communion at least once a month11. Only 9% of the members of the Orthodoxy are 
familiar with the Holy Trinity dogma, which is a basic tenet for Christians12.
7 Levada Centre, December 2013, http://www.levada.ru/24-12-2013/rossiyane-o-religii
8 Levada Centre, April 2013, http://www.levada.ru/18-04-2013/religiya-i-tserkov-v-obsh-
chestvennoi-zhizni-0 
9 This concerns representatives of various religions, http://www.levada.ru/24-12-2013/rossi-
yane-o-religii
10 Levada Centre, December 2012, http://www.levada.ru/17-12-2012/v-rossii-74-pravoslavnykh-
i-7-musulman
11 Data for 2013, http://www.levada.ru/24-12-2013/rossiyane-o-religii
12 A survey conducted as part of the Sreda project, June 2014, http://sreda.org/ru/opros/59-
dogmat-o-presvyatoy-troitse-znayut-9-pravoslavnyih-rossiyan 
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Distribution of the answer to the question: Do you attend church services? 
If so, how often?13
answer % 1991 1998 2007 2011 2013
Several times a week <1 2 – 2 1
Once a week 1 2 2 2 4
Two to three times 
a month
1 4 6 3 3
Once a month 3 4 12 5 6
Several times a year 9 18 17 19 17
More or less once a year 9 18 – 11 16
Less than once a year 7 16 17 12 13
Never 67 61 43 45 35
I don’t know 3 – 4 3 6
What also indirectly proves that Russians are not really attached to the Or-
thodox faith is the degree to which they respect the values promoted by the 
orthodox church, such as the family, the protection of life and abstinence 
from intoxicants. The nominal ‘revival of faith’ in Russia over the past few 
years has been accompanied by an only slightly more restrictive approach to 
the moral principles promoted by the Church. One example of this is the very 
liberal attitude towards abortion among Russians, which remains legal and 
is commonly perceived as a birth control measure in Russia. According to of-
ficial statistics, the abortion rate in this country in 2012 was 56 abortions per 
100 live births14, and this number covers only officially registered abortions. 
In the opinion of specialists, the real number of terminated pregnancies may 
exceed 1 million annually, while the official number of live births in Russia in 
2013 was less than 500,00015.
13 Levada Centre, December 2013, http://www.levada.ru/24-12-2013/rossiyane-o-religii 
This survey concerns the Russian population as a whole.
14 Demoscope Weekly, http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2014/0587/barom03.php
15 For example, MP Yelena Mizulina stated that 5–12 million abortions are carried out in 
Russia annually, http://www.russian.rfi.fr/node/54731. In turn, according to MP Natalia 
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Russians also have a liberal attitude towards marriage, one proof of which is 
the high number of divorces. Around 50% of marriages in Russia are dissolved, 
and the divorce ratio is 4.7 per 1,000 people16, which, according to UN rankings, 
makes Russia one of the world leaders17. Even though the Orthodox Church of-
ficially permits divorces in special cases, in general the break-up of families is 
contrary to the values promoted by the Church.
The Church is also opposed to alcohol abuse, which is one of the burning social 
problems in Russia, being the cause of a great proportion of crimes, accidents 
and deaths (according to the Ministry for Health, accidents resulting from al-
cohol consumption are among the most frequent causes of male deaths in Rus-
sia18). According to official statistics, an average Russian drinks an equivalent 
of 15.1 litres of pure grain alcohol annually19 (homebrew, which is popular in 
Russia, was not taken into account), which is one of the world’s highest ratios. 
Public opinion polls indicate that many Russians view alcohol as a good stress 
remedy20.
It is also characteristic of Russian society that the Orthodox tradition and cul-
ture are viewed in the public consciousness as elements of the Russian culture 
in the broad meaning of the term. Various superstitions and folk customs orig-
inating from old pagan beliefs or modern occultism function in this culture 
alongside Orthodoxy. According to surveys, around 40% of Russians believe in 
magic and astrology, and around 20% of them admit that they believe in trans-
migration of souls21, which is antithetical to Christianity. Thus the view of the 
world of most Russians is full of contradictions: the various elements function 
in it alongside each other, however, not colliding but rather being mutually com-
plementary.
Karpovich, this number is 1.7 million, http://www.km.ru/front-projects/demografiya/
abort-po-russki-6-millionov-ubitykh-detei-v-god. The data concerning live births in 2013 
originate from Rosstat, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/
statistics/population/demography/#
16 Rosstat, data for 2013, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/sta-
tistics/population/demography/#
17 Classification of United Nations Demographic Yearbook quoted in Wikipedia, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divorce_demography
18 Statement made by Minister Veronika Skvortsova in October 2014, http://www3.vz.ru/
news/2014/10/20/711377.html
19 Data from Russia’s profile on WHO portal for 2014, people older than were taken into ac-
count; http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/profiles/en/ 
20 http://ria.ru/society/20140716/1016197515.html
21 http://mospravda.ru/life/article/strana_syevernih_ludei/
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2. Russians’ attitude towards the Russian orthodox church
The Russian Orthodox Church and its head, Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and 
All Rus’, are highly respected among the Russian public. According to public 
opinion polls, the ROC is one of Russia’s most respected public institutions – 48% 
Russian citizens trusted the Church fully and 25% partly in 2013. Only 10% of 
the Russian public expressed distrust to this institution 22.
The patriarch’s popularity reached its peak in 2012, when his moves were backed 
by 69% of Russians, and only 28% disapproved of them23. Furthermore, Patriarch 
Kirill has a high position in the ranking of the most influential politicians who 
enjoy public confidence in Russia – he is ranked seventh, before the head of the 
Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko, and the mayor of Moscow, Sergey So-
byanin24. Thus, is shows that the Russian public view the primate of the ROC as 
a political actor. In public opinion polls, residents of Russia have used primarily 
positive terms to describe the patriarch – ‘wise’ (42%), ‘decent’ (31%), ‘good’ (24%)25.
The high level of public confidence in the Church above all results from the 
fact that it is perceived by citizens as an institution linked to Russian culture 
and state tradition. The Orthodox Church witnessed the formation of Russian 
statehood, and is an element which highlights its continuity. For this reason the 
ROC possesses high symbolic capital in Russia, and this guarantees it respect 
from the citizens.
Another reason for the high confidence in the ROC is the fact that the key public 
and political institutions in Russia, such as the police, the judiciary or the po-
litical parties, are barely respected by the general public. As compared to weak 
institutions, the Church enjoys visibly more esteem. There are only two Russian 
institutions that have a similarly high level of public confidence: the president and 
the army. Another factor which has contributed to the Church’s positive image is 
its increasing activity in the social sphere, including aid to the poor or affected by 
diseases, and this meets with a high level of public acceptance in Russia.
22 http://www.levada.ru/print/07-10-2013/doverie-institutam-vlasti
23 Public support for the patriarch at that time was 1 percentage point higher than for presi-
dent Putin, http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=47981
24 http://www.levada.ru/26-11-2014/noyabrskie-reitingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya
25 This was a closed-ended question. The suggested answers also included negative evaluations, 
such as weak, deceptive, untrustworthy, http://www.levada.ru/31-01-2014/otnoshenie-ros-
siyan-k-patriarkhu-moskovskomu-i-vseya-rusi-kirillu
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State-controlled media, the primary source of information for a definite major-
ity of Russians, play an essential role in strengthening the positive perception of 
the Orthodox Church by the public26. The media pay a great deal of attention to 
the patriarch’s activity and the ROC’s initiatives, and show them in a good light. 
For example, they broadcast religious ceremonies, offer coverage to ceremonies 
accompanying the peregrinations of Orthodox relics across Russia, and they 
repeat the statements of representatives of the Orthodox clergy concerning is-
sues that are important from the point of view of the public.
It also needs to be emphasised that the building of closer bonds with the Krem-
lin, as observed since the collapse of communism and which has recently de-
veloped on an unprecedented scale at the Kremlin’s initiative, also offers short-
term PR benefits to the Church. In effect, most Russians identify the ROC as an 
element of the political system in Russia, and not as a solely religious institution. 
Owing to this, the high level of public support for the government seen over 
the past few years27 linked partly to the euphoric reaction to the annexation of 
Crimea, in the public consciousness also extends to Church structures and the 
patriarch himself. Most supporters of the present government automatically 
identify themselves with the Church and view declaration of belonging to the 
Orthodox religion as a declaration of patriotism.
3. the criticism of the Russian orthodox church
Circles which criticise the ROC and its primate for excessive engagement in 
political issues and the loss of neutrality have also crystallised over the past 
few years in Russia. According to data for 2013, around 50% of respondents in 
Russia expressed the opinion that the Church should not be engaged in poli-
tics but it should rather only deal with questions that are important from the 
point of view of religion and morality (this proportion increased from 43% in 
200928). The critical opinion of the ROC’s political activity has been expressed, 
for example, by representatives of the liberal opposition circles, independent 
intelligentsia and nationalists representing the ethnic trend. However, their 
26 Television remains the main source of information about the world for 90% of the Russian 
population. Levada Centre’s data, http://www.levada.ru/17-06-2014/rossiiskii-media-land-
shaft-televidenie-pressa-internet
27 In December 2014, 85% of Russians backed President Putin’s moves, http://www.levada.
ru/24-12-2014/dekabrskie-reitingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya
28 These are the latest available data on this subject. Survey conducted by WCIOM, October 
2013, http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=114598
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disapproval of the ROC’s political engagement is motivated by different factors, 
and some of the ROC critics are people who identify themselves with Orthodoxy 
as their religion.
Some critics of the ROC became disillusioned by the patriarch’s reaction to the 
mass anti-governmental protests in late 2011/early 2012 in which these groups 
took part (he appealed to the protesters to end demonstrations). The patriarch’s 
appeal was understood as proof that the Church had chosen to be completely 
subordinate to the government and had closed itself to dialogue with the most 
politically active part of the Russian public. What is more Russians who have 
more liberal views negatively evaluated Patriarch Kirill’s reaction to the perfor-
mance by members of Pussy Riot group in the Orthodox cathedral in Moscow 
in February 201229. The patriarch insisted on a strict penalty for the women 
for insulting the religious sensibilities of Orthodox Christians. The Russian 
government used this incident to introduce a law imposing penal liability for 
insulting religious feelings, which has been used as an instrument of political 
pressure on anti-Kremlin circles. However, it needs to be emphasised that the 
patriarch’s reaction corresponded to the sentiments shared by a majority of the 
Russian public, who were very critical of Pussy Riot’s action.
Some social groups became critical of Patriarch Kirill as a consequence of media 
reports on his involvement in moral scandals, for example, concerning his 
reported assets, a luxury flat in the centre of Moscow and an expensive watch30 
which Moscow Patriarchate’s press service ineptly attempted to remove from 
a photograph published in the Internet. These scandals undermined the ROC’s 
reputation, since they laid bare the dissonance between the Christian teachings 
promoted by the Church and the clergy’s behaviour. They also revealed the lack 
of pR strategy and the organisational weakness of the church administra-
tion which was unable to ward off intensifying criticism – mainly from Internet 
users, and thus younger and more active members of the Russian public.
Some Russians criticise the ROC for its intolerance, obscurantism and hostil-
ity towards progress. One reason for this is the various actions taken by the 
clergy – for example, their protest against ‘Neptune Day’, celebrated by young 
29 The women sang the song ‘Mother of God, Chase Putin Away!’ criticising the president in 
the cathedral.
30 The apartment scandal was publicised among others by Rosbalt agency: http://www.ros-
balt.ru/moscow/2012/03/22/960327.html; the information about the ‘disappearing’ watch 
is available here: http://www.newsru.com/religy/04apr2012/uhr.html
16
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people in Voronezh oblast, due to its ‘non-compliance with Christian values’31 or 
the incident when a group of lay church members led by a priest interrupted an 
anniversary concert organised by Silver Rain radio in Moscow because the mu-
sic was too loud32. In December, Protopriest Vsevolod Chaplin, chairman of the 
synodal department for co-operation with the public of Moscow Patriarchate, 
appealed to Russians to stop using Apple’s electronic gadgets arguing that these 
were tools of manipulation33. Reports on exorcisms performed by clergymen in 
public34 or their contacts with nationalists with Fascist inclinations that have 
been circulated online have also provoked unfavourable reactions among some 
segments of Russian society.
Thus over the past two years public opinion has become polarised in Russia 
as regards the ROC’s activity and its co-operation with the Kremlin – a definite 
majority of the public who have a positive attitude towards the Church’s activity 
have become consolidated in response to the criticism, while the minority who 
are critical about the Church have been branded as enemies of the Church and 
the Kremlin, and as such have been pushed to the margin of socio-political life.
31 This happened in 2013, for more see: http://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/495241.html
32 People came from the nearby church claiming that the overly loud music did not allow them 
to pray. 
33 http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=monitor&id=22083
34 For example, the developments in Transnistria were broadly publicised in Russia, http://
focus.ua/world/331220/
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ii. the Russian oRthodox chuRch as an institution
The Russian Orthodox Church is currently the largest religious community in 
Russia and in the entire post-Soviet area. Its jurisdiction covers 30,675 parishes 
(and a similar number of churches and clergymen) and over 800 monasteries35. 
This makes it the world’s most numerous autocephalous Orthodox Church, the 
estimated number of its members being estimated at 150 million36. Most mem-
bers of this Church are residents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, which are 
viewed by the ROC as its indisputable ‘canonical territory’37, as well as in other 
countries which were set up in the post-Soviet area. Less numerous Orthodox 
communities which are within the ROC’s jurisdiction are also present in other 
countries, for example, France, the United Kingdom, Austria and Canada.
Being a religious organisation with the largest nominal number of members 
in Russia, the ROC plays an essential role in the socio-political processes in 
the country.
1. the authorities of the Russian orthodox church – 
characteristics and views
The incumbent Patriarch has made himself known on the one hand as a sup-
porter of a conservative approach to the development of society and the state, 
and a promoter of building closer bonds between the religion and secular au-
thorities, and on the other as a skilful diplomat and manager. the position of 
the conservative wing in the Roc, which to a great extent represents the 
views of the patriarch himself, has become stronger under his influence. The 
structure of the Church authorities has been centralised and personalised over 
the past few years, which also reflects the processes taking place within Russia’s 
political establishment.
35 Data for 2012, for more information see: http://www.russia.ru/news/society/2012/9/20/967.
html
36 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Christian_denominations_by_number_of_members
37 The ROC’s canonical territory, as understood by the Church, is its natural zone of influence. 
It covers the countries inhabited by followers of the Orthodox religion: Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova and other post-Soviet countries where members of the Orthodox Church 
live. The Church expects that other Christian religions, especially the Roman Catholic 
Church, should be banned within this territory. This term, in the present meaning, ap-
peared in the public discourse in late 1980s/early 1990s in the context of operation of Greek 
Catholics in Ukraine, and patriarch Kirill is believed to be the person who popularised it. 
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patriarch Kirill
Kirill (secular name Vladimir Mikhailovich Gundyayev) was born on 20 
November 1946 in Leningrad. His father was a clergyman. He studied at 
Leningrad Theological Academy. He received holy orders as a priest in 1969 
and adopted the name of Kirill. In 1971-1974, he served as a representative of 
Moscow Patriarchate at the World Council of Churches in Geneva. In 1974-
1984, he was the rector of Leningrad Theological Academy.
In 1989, he was entrusted with the function of chairman of the department 
for external contacts of Moscow Patriarchate, where he for years managed 
the ecumenical and foreign contacts of the ROC. He also became (as the De-
partment head) a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Russian Or-
thodox Church. From 1988, following the reorganisation of the eparchy, he 
became archbishop of Kaliningrad and Smolensk, and in 1991 he was pro-
moted to the rank of a metropolitan. He also was a member of the Council 
for Co-operation with Religious Organisations attached to the President 
of the Russian Federation. Since 1994, Kirill has hosted the religious pro-
gramme called ‘The Shepherd’s Word’ on state-controlled TV Programme 1.
In the 1990s, he received a great deal of publicity after the newspaper Mosk-
ovsky Komsomolets disclosed that the department for external contacts of 
the Moscow Patriarchate, led by him in 1994–1997, took part in organising 
the transportation of alcohol (mainly wine) and tobacco to Russia under 
the guise of humanitarian aid, benefiting from customs duty exemptions 
in the process. Kirill’s reputation was also tarnished by the reports that 
he had supervised duty-free transports of goods from Russia to Belarus in 
1997–2000, and later was involved in organising imports of luxury Mer-
cedes cars to Russia.
Kirill himself supervised the work on the document titled ‘Basics of Social 
Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church’ adopted in 2000 outlining the 
ROC’s stance on a number of social phenomena and Church relations with 
the secular government in the state. This is the first programme document 
in the Church’s history to discuss such issues, and it, in essence, presents 
a very conservative and anti-liberal stance. Nevertheless, it was partly 
modelled on the social teachings of the Catholic Church. As a consequence, 
Kirill, who had had regular contacts with the Catholic clergy during his 
visits abroad, began to be suspected of crypto-Catholicism in Russia.
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Kirill’s greatest achievement at the time when he was in charge of the 
ROC’s diplomacy was bringing about the unification of the Moscow Patri-
archate and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in 2007, on terms set by 
the external contacts department. This move, in addition to symbolic and 
PR advantages, offered significant financial benefits to the ROC, since its 
incomes from wealthy foreign parishes increased. Kirill also made success-
ful efforts for the ROC to take control over individual temples administered 
by Orthodox communities independent of the Moscow Patriarchate, which 
are important for Moscow considering their historic value and significance 
in religious life. Owing to his endeavours, the Moscow Patriarchate has 
been able to establish its supremacy over several important Orthodox cen-
tres in France, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Being a skilful negotiator, 
Kirill has earned the reputation of a talented diplomat.
Even while his predecessor, Alexy II, was still alive, Kirill was gradually 
taking over some of the ROC head’s obligations. After Patriarch Alexy’s 
death in 2008 he became the regent of the patriarchal throne, and then in 
January 2009 the Local Council elected him the sixteenth patriarch of Mos-
cow and All Rus’. The election of the new patriarch in 2009 was preceded by 
an extensive media campaign conducted by the state government, aimed 
at promoting Metropolitan Kirill as the most suitable candidate supported 
by the Kremlin. During the vote, Kirill’s candidacy was backed by most 
church hierarchs and representatives of the laity. The official enthrone-
ment ceremony, which took place on 1 February 2009 at Christ the Saviour 
Cathedral in Moscow, was described by the main Russian public TV chan-
nels as an epochal event in the life of the ROC and the country as a whole. 
The character and the splendour of this ceremony signified that a new stage 
of the ROC’s symbiosis with the state had begun38.
There are allegations indicating that Kirill owes his astonishing career as 
a representative of the Church at the World Council of Churches and then 
as the head of the external contacts department to his connections with 
Soviet (KGB) and then Russian (FSB) secret services. According to recur-
rent media reports, he acted as a secret associate using the operational code 
name ‘Mikhailov’39.
38 The full text of the new patriarch’s speech during the enthronement ceremony can be found 
at http://www.aif.ru/society/8991
39 For more information see: http://www.compromat.ru/page_23895.htm
20
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
2/
20
15
The present patriarch’s views can be characterised as nationalist-imperialist 
and pro-Kremlin. Firstly, he is the main supporter and promoter of the ‘Rus-
sian world’ concept (русский мир), under which, according to the Church’s in-
terpretation, all Orthodox Christians belong to one Church and to one Orthodox 
nation. Geographically, the ‘Russian world’ extends over territories inhabited 
by eastern Slavs, which once belonged to the historical ‘Holy Rus’, i.e. in ad-
dition to Russia the territories of Ukraine, Belarus and – in the broader sense 
– the Russian-speaking and Orthodox diasporas in other countries across the 
world. The ROC believes that its mission is to lead to a unification of all Orthodox 
Christians under the spiritual leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate, which is 
represented by what they believe to be the only canonical church in this area. 
The patriarch’s pastoral visits to the countries which are believed to be part of 
the ‘Russian world’, the missionary activity and the strengthening of informal 
personal influence in this area are among the many measures taken to promote 
the ‘Russian world’ idea. One example of such actions were Patriarch Kirill’s 
frequent pastoral visits to Ukraine, at the time of which he appealed for the 
schism in Ukrainian Orthodoxy40 to be overcome and for the building of closer 
contacts with the Moscow Patriarchate, which, in his opinion, is the legitimate 
‘mother church’ for Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
The patriarch also voices Moscow’s aspirations to hold historical and religious 
primacy in the entire Orthodox Church, which may be understood as a refer-
ence to the ‘third Rome’ concept. According to this concept, after the fall of 
Byzantium, Moscow became the legitimate successor of the entire Christian 
tradition and claims the right to view itself as the most important of all auto-
cephalous Orthodox Churches. The argument which representatives of the ROC 
often raise is that it is at present the world’s largest Orthodox Church41. The Mos-
cow Patriarchate’s geopolitical aspirations have on many occasions provoked 
tension between the ROC and the Constantinople (Ecumenical) Patriarchate 
holding the symbolic primacy over Orthodoxy worldwide, which is questioned 
by the ROC on a regular basis.
40 For more information on the religious situation in Ukraine see: Tadeusz A. Olszański, The 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s stance on the revolution and war, OSW Commentary, 30 Octo-
ber 2014, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-10-30/ukrainian-
orthodox-churchs-stance-revolution-and-war
41 For example, Metropolitan Hilarion’s statement in which he claims that the ROC is the 
world’s largest Orthodox Church the number of whose members is higher than the total 
number of the members of all other Orthodox Churches altogether, http://www.interfax-
religion.ru/?act=news&div=20896
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In the early stage of Kirill’s primacy of the ROC he was perceived as a more pro-
gressive and open-minded person than his predecessor Alexy, but it soon turned 
out that he represented a conservative approach to social and moral issues 
and openly supported the Kremlin. The fact that Kirill was determined to 
build closer contacts with the Kremlin became evident, for example, at the time 
of the civil protests in Moscow in late 2011/early 2012, when Kirill discouraged 
members of the Orthodox Church from taking part in the protests, arguing that 
“Orthodox Christians don’t go to demonstrations”42.
Furthermore, the patriarch is known for his nationalist and anti-Western 
views. One manifestation of these is his opinion that a ‘religious war’ is being 
fought in Ukraine that is targeted against the canonical Russian Orthodoxy43. 
In the opinion other members of Church hierarchy, this war is being fought by 
‘schismatics’ and ‘Uniates’ supported by the West. Another view presented by 
the patriarch is that the real reason for the economic sanctions imposed by the 
West on Russia in 2014 was the desire to humiliate Russian citizens and under-
mine their sense of national solidarity44. Such statements and were in line with 
the Kremlin’s narrative.
The patriarch would not accept any criticism and demands full loyalty from 
his associates. Proofs of this include the way he disregards any signs of criti-
cism from the public (for example, in response to the moral scandals) and by 
obstructing any manifestations of pluralism inside the ROC. For instance, he 
dismissed the popular Orthodox publicist Andrey Kuraev from his position as 
a tutor at Moscow Theological Academy. Probably the reason for the dismiss-
al were accusations that Kuraev waspublishing ‘scandalous and provocative’ 
statements concerning issues linked to the ROC on his blog and thus acting 
against the Church’s interests45. Kuraev, who used to have the patriarch’s full 
confidence, according to commentators, was finally forbidden from making any 
public statements, which can be interpreted as an attempt to introduce internal 
censorship inside the church.
42 Patriarch Kirill’s speech of 1 February 2012, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1992020.
html
43 This opinion was presented, for example, in Patriarch Kirill’s letter of 18 August 2014, https://
mospat.ru/ru/2014/08/14/news106782/
44 An opinion voiced on 4 November 2014, http://nr2.com.ua/News/world_and_russia/Patri-
arh-Kirill-Zapad-vvel-sankcii-chtoby-ponizit-nacionalnoe-samosoznanie-rossiyan-83927.
html
45 Information of 3 January 2014, http://www.pravmir.ru/diakona-andreya-kuraeva-otchis-
lili-i-professorov-mda-kommentarii-1/
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2. structural and staff reform – towards centralisation
The patriarch performs above all a representational function in the ROC, and 
his decisions need to be approved by the Holy Synod, which is a collegial body. 
However, since Kirill assumed this function, the impression has been created 
in the public awareness that the ROC primate’s prerogatives are much more 
extensive than those set down under Church regulations, and that he plays 
a key role in the ROC, similar to that of the pope in the Roman Catholic Church. 
An extensive structural and staff reform began to be implemented in the 
ROC upon Kirill’s initiative, as a result of which the patriarch’s position was 
strengthened. As emphasised by commentators, the process of consolidation 
of power in the Orthodox Church is not over yet and is evolving more and more 
towards authoritarianism. Thus it increasingly resembles the process of cen-
tralisation of political power as observed for several years in Russia.
As part of this reform, during the Holy Synod in 2009, Kirill established new 
organisational units within the structure of the ROC. It is worth noting above 
all the fact that a synodal department for co-operation with the public was cre-
ated which was supposed to symbolise the Church’s ‘openness’ to dialogue with 
society. The responsibilities of this structure include co-operation with state 
authorities as well as with political and social organisations: political parties, 
trade unions and NGOs within the ROC’s ‘canonical territory’. The department 
is managed by Protopriest Vsevolod Chaplin, Kirill’s former deputy in the exter-
nal contacts department. However, Chaplin, whose views can be characterised 
as nationalist-imperialist and pro-Kremlin, has on many occasions provoked 
controversies with his statements and criticism from some sections of the pub-
lic. For example, he has insisted on introducing a special Orthodox dress code 
in Russia (for example, forbidding women from wearing short skirts), thus es-
tranging some members of the Orthodox Church and representatives of other 
religions. In turn, in spring 2014, he publicly supported the idea of sending Rus-
sian troops to Ukraine with the aim to perform a kind of ‘civilisational mission’ 
there46, which outraged Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
Another major change was the creation of the Moscow Patriarchate’s finan-
cial and economic board47, which began to supervise in a centralised manner 
the growing assets and finances of the Church. Bishop Tikhon (Zaitsev), who 
46 Statement of 1 March 2014, http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2014/03/01/n_5985053.
shtml
47 The department’s website is: http://www.fedmp.ru/
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was Patriarch Kirill’s close associate when he managed the external contacts 
department, was put in charge of this unit.
The Moscow Patriarchate’s secretariat for foreign Church units, which reports 
directly to the patriarch, has also been created. It has been tasked with canoni-
cal supervision and administrative and financial control of the ROC’s units and 
organisations located abroad. The secretariat is managed by Archbishop Mark 
(Golovkov).
Another major staffing decision was putting Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev) 
of Volokolamsk in charge of the ROC’s external contacts department and the 
Church’s relations with the state government. At the same time, Hilarion be-
came the head of the Saint Cyril and Methodius Theological Institute of Post-
Graduate and Doctoral Studies, which was established in 2009 and where future 
elites of the ROC receive education48. Hilarion, as an academic teacher with an 
extensive education (for example, he composes classical music), has been able to 
build a circle of influential intellectuals sympathising with the Church around 
himself.
Another novelty is the fact that the largest Church bodies began to employ 
secular professionals; for example, Vladimir Legoyda, editor of the Orthodox 
magazine Foma, was nominated head of the newly established synodal informa-
tion department. Before his nomination, Legoyda was the head of a department 
of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), which has 
a reputation for being the main source of staff for Soviet and Russian diplomacy.
In parallel to this, the new patriarch, by means of adequate staffing policy and 
reorganisation, has neutralised his opponents, pushing them to the margin of 
Church hierarchy. During the first two years of his primacy, Kirill removed his 
competitors from the Synod, as a result of which the patriarch’s impact on deci-
sions of this body has strengthened. In 2009, Metropolitan Kliment (Kapalin) 
of Kaluga and Borovsk, who was Kirill’s main rival for the patriarchal throne, 
left the Synod. Metropolitan Hilarion, Kirill’s close associate, was among the 
new members of the Synod.
In addition to this, it is worth noting organisational changes in the Roc 
initiated in 2011. Two trends can be observed. On the one hand, they lead to 
48 120 novices studied at this institute in 2011.
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reinforcing the vertical structure of power in the Roc, based on a three-
level organisational structure: patriarchy – metropolis – eparchy (diocese). 
The originators of the changes wanted the patriarchate’s direct control, includ-
ing financial, to be tightened over the eparchies which report to it, and local 
bishops, some of whom had broad autonomy and earned great fortunes without 
paying church taxes, to become subordinate to the patriarchate. On the other 
hand, the reform has led to fragmentation of the Roc’s structure. Some 
larger eparchies have been divided into smaller ones in order to facilitate cen-
tralised control and to increase the number of eparchies located in Russia in the 
entire structure of the ROC. The ROC’s authorities thus wanted to change the 
proportions between the number of eparchies located in and outside Russia, 
which carries a symbolic meaning. Before the ROC’s reform was launched, it was 
comprised of a total of 187 eparchies (most of which were located in Ukraine); 
now it has 279 eparchies, including 159 in Russia49.
49 Data http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/organizations/ 
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iii. the Russian oRthodox chuRch  
vs. the goveRnment
The Russian Orthodox Church, being an organisation with extensive infra-
structure providing access to various social groups and having highly valuable 
symbolic capital, is a valuable partner for the government in Russia. This part-
nership offers the government benefits at home and in foreign policy – the 
Church is important as an institution which integrates Russian-speaking dias-
poras and as a soft power instrument that can be employed to promote Russia’s 
political interests abroad. The ROC’s close co-operation with the government 
has been based on the principle of ‘loyalty in exchange for support’, and has of-
fered tangible benefits to the Church in many areas. The Church’s ever stronger 
integration with the Russian political system indicates that, according to the 
Church’s calculations, these benefits outweigh the risks and problems that en-
sue from the ROC’s overly strong subordination to the Kremlin.
1. orthodoxy and the Russian orthodox church  
in the government’s policy
As regards internal policy, Orthodoxy and the Church play an important role 
in promoting and implementing the conservative project developed by the 
Kremlin. The Russian government’s decisive turn towards Orthodoxy and the 
Church has been evident since Vladimir Putin became the Russian president 
for the third time, i.e. since 2012. After seeing the rapid increase in the popu-
larity of Orthodoxy among the Russian public since the 1990’s, the government 
concluded that religion could become a unifying factor for a heterogeneous so-
ciety experiencing a state identity crisis. Vladimir Putin mentioned the state-
building role of religion in his manifesto article ‘Russia: the national issue’50 in 
January 2012. He stated then that the values promoted by all four ‘traditional’ 
religions present in Russia (i.e. Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism), such as 
mercy, truth, justice and family ideals, are the ‘principal moral and spiritual 
values’ that consolidate the Russian nation.
In turn, during his meeting with participants of the All-Russian Youth Forum by 
Lake Seliger in 2012, Putin directly mentioned the special role of Orthodoxy in 
state-building: “As regards Orthodoxy, it has played a special role in our coun-
try’s history. I would like everyone to hear this. Why? Because before Prince 
50 The whole article see: Владимир Путин, Национальный вопрос, Независимая газета, 
23 January 2012, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html
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Vladimir baptised Rus’ and then united it, we had no single Russian state, and 
the Russian nation as such did not exist”51.
Representatives of the Russian government claim that attachment to Christian 
values is the foundation of the ‘unique Russian civilisation’ and a factor which 
distinguishes Russian society from the secularised and demoralised Western 
societies who, in their opinion, have turned their backs on the Christian val-
ues which had founded them. Putin proposed this thesis during his annual ad-
dress at the Federal Assembly in 2014, stating: “Today, moral standards in many 
countries have been turned upside down, national traditions and differences 
between nations and cultures are fading. (…) This ‘top-down’ destruction of 
traditional values not only has negative effects on societies but also is totally 
undemocratic, because this is implemented on the grounds of abstract ideas 
which are taken out of context against the will of most of the people who do not 
accept the coming changes and the proposed revision. And we know that there 
are more and more people across the world who support our stance as regards 
protection of traditional values, which have been the spiritual and moral foun-
dation of civilisation, of each nation over millennia: the values of a traditional 
family, true human life, including also religious life, not only material (…). Ob-
viously, this is a conservative approach”52. This way, the defence of Christian 
values, which until recently was the domain of the Church in Russia53, has be-
come part of the Kremlin’s agenda. Employing such conservative slogans, the 
Kremlin has been attempting to consolidate the Russian public and to win the 
favours of foreign partners.
In the domestic context, the government also draws upon Orthodoxy and the 
ROC as part of its identity policy aimed at strengthening social bonds and 
patriotic conduct among the Russian public. The Kremlin emphasises that 
the Church is an element which guarantees the continuity of Russian culture 
and statehood – the Orthodox Holy Rus’ is viewed as a protoplast of the Russian 
state. It is important that the Kremlin, while implementing its internal policy 
goals, does not mind the Russian public’s superficial attitude towards religion. 
This is so because it does not draw on profound religious sentiment but rather 
51 A transcript of the meeting which took place on 31 July 2012, see: http://www.kremlin.ru/
transcripts/16106
52 The presidential address of 12 December 2013, http://kremlin.ru/news/19825
53 In January 2011, the synodal department for co-operation with the public in a special docu-
ment titled ‘The list of Russian values’ listed the values it defends; for more information see: 
http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=39255
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on conservatism in thein the colloquial sense. Stimulating the development of 
deep religiosity among the public as part of any of the religions present in Russia 
might contribute to provoking religious radicalism, and thus security problems 
the government would have to deal with.
Close relations with the Church also offers pR benefits to the Kremlin. Good 
contacts with the ROC, a respected and long-lived social institution, make rep-
resentatives of the political establishment seem more trustworthy to the Rus-
sian public. Good relations with the ROC ensure prestige to the Kremlin and an 
additional ‘sacral’ legitimacy of its power, being a reference to the Byzantine 
tradition. This is why the state-controlled media offer extensive coverage to 
meetings of the Kremlin’s representatives with Church hierarchs, and govern-
ment members seek the patriarch’s support for their own initiatives (for exam-
ple, ahead of elections) and offer him congratulations on various occasions in 
public (for example, on his Birthday).
Another area of the ROC’s operation that is beneficial from the Kremlin’s point 
of view is social activity. Thus, the government transfers to Church entities 
part of its functions in the social area which it is unable to deal with by itself, for 
example, assimilation centres and language courses for immigrants. This way, 
with the Church’s help, the Kremlin softens some social issues, and the ROC is 
rewarded financially for carrying out the tasks of the state as part of ministerial 
programmes and grants. On the other hand, such co-operation offers the ROC 
access to sensitive social groups where it is able to conduct its pastoral activity.
The ROC bodies also offer the Kremlin an efficient channel of communica-
tion with the public and an instrument for influencing public opinion. 
For example, the patriarch backed the legislative changes introduced by the 
Kremlin imposing penal liability for insulting religious feelings (in effect 
since 1 July 2013) and for propagating untraditional sexual behaviours among 
minors (in effect since 2 July 2013), which liberal circles have described as 
another stage of restricting freedom of speech and conscience in Russia. How-
ever, Kirill made efforts to lessen public dissatisfaction, arguing that pass-
ing the laws was the right thing to do and in the interest of the Church and 
the public. Another example of the Church’s attempts to neutralise negative 
social sentiments were the patriarch’s statements concerning the impact of 
Western sanctions on Russian consumers and the consequences of the Rus-
sian currency’s devaluation. In his speeches towards the end of 2014, the pri-
mate of the ROC made effort to calm down the public and encourage them to 
make sacrifices. His line of argument that the West, in its attempt to destroy 
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the national pride and sovereignty of Russians, was responsible for Russia’s 
economic problems, dovetailed with the statements made by representatives 
of the Kremlin54.
Co-operation with the Church is strongly valued by the government in for-
eign policy, especially with regard to those CIS countries where Orthodoxy is 
the predominant religion. This co-operation is based on the shared interests of 
the two parties which want to strengthen their influence in this area. Mutual 
interests naturally create conditions for tightening co-operation between the 
two partners.
Firstly, the Church plays an active role in the process of consolidation of 
Russian-speaking diasporas outside Russia: above all in such post-Soviet 
countries as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and also in other former Soviet 
republics and other countries where members of the Orthodox Church live. 
To strengthen its influence in the area inhabited by Orthodox Christians, the 
Kremlin has adapted for its own purposes the ‘Russian world’ concept promoted 
by the Church, which is aimed at justifying Moscow’s desire to dominate in this 
area, not only in religious but also in political terms. The Russian government’s 
imperial aspirations also go in line with the ‘Holy Rus’ idea, according to which 
the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian nations have common roots.
Church structures and social organisations linked to the Church, for example 
parish Sunday schools and Russian language schools that are run as part of 
parishes, are engaged in practical activities aimed at consolidation of the dias-
poras. Evidence of co-operation between the state and the Church in this area 
includes actions implemented by Church organisations jointly with the Russian 
governmental agency Rossotrudnichestvo55 – for example, foreign conferences 
and exhibitions. This agency was established in 2008 to support Russians living 
outside the country. However, its real goal is to expand Russia’s influence in the 
CIS area and to build a friendly atmosphere for the implementation of Russia’s 
political and economic interests abroad. Patriarch Kirill has on numerous oc-
casions emphasised the importance and the effectiveness of co-operation with 
54 For more information on the patriarch’s speech of 4 November 2014 see: http://ruskline.ru/
news_rl/2014/11/06/svyatejshij_patriarh_kirill_sankcii_napravleny_na_to_chtoby_lyu-
di_perestali_dumat_ob_obwenacionalnom/
55 The full name of this structure, which was established in May 2008, is the Federal Agency 
for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and Internation-
al Humanitarian Co-operation.
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Rossotrudnichestvo, for instance, during his meeting with the agency’s head, 
Konstantin Kosachev, in April 201456.
In the international arena, the Kremlin also benefits from the church’s cul-
tural activity aimed at promoting the positive image of Orthodoxy and Russian 
culture among residents of Western countries who know little about real Rus-
sian politics – for example, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, etc. This 
activity includes issuing publications concerning religious and cultural sub-
jects in foreign languages, holding cultural events, such as expositions of Rus-
sian Orthodox culture and film festivals. In this context, the ROC is becoming 
a soft power instrument for the Kremlin, helping it to form a positive attitude 
towards Russian policy among the international community in a subtle way.
Another area of the ROC’s operation in the international arena which is impor-
tant from the Kremlin’s point of view are the efforts made with the intention of 
establishing closer relations between Russian orthodoxy and representa-
tives of other christian denominations, which the ROC is endeavouring to 
do in the conviction that it is necessary to protect shared values and to combat 
ever stronger secularisation. The ROC does this as part of various commissions 
operating within the most senior structures of the Moscow Patriarchate. Met-
ropolitan Hilarion, the head of the external contacts department, is especially 
active in this area.
One partner which is especially important for the ROC in the international 
arena for PR and ideological reasons is the Vatican. One example of the suc-
cessful establishment of relations was the common conference organised jointly 
in Rome with the Pontifical Council for the Family, concerning the protection 
of the traditional family and entitled ‘Orthodox Christians and Catholics stand 
together in defence of the family’57, which was widely commented on in Russia.
Furthermore, various social organisations linked to the ROC which are involved 
in international activity, reach influential representatives of foreign politi-
cal and business circles who share conservative values and are opposed to 
56 This meeting took place on 25 April 2014, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3637879.html
57 The conference was organised by the Moscow Patriarchate’s external contacts department 
and the Pontifical Council for the Family. It took place in November 2013. For more informa-
tion see: https://mospat.ru/en/2013/11/13/news94251/
The full text of the address is here: http://episkopat.pl/dokumenty/pozostale/4396.1,Wspol-
ne_Przeslanie_do_Narodow_Polski_i_Rosji.html
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European integration. They consolidate these circles what plays an important 
function from the Kremlin’s point of view. in this way, the church helps to 
create a platform for international debate and co-operation as an alterna-
tive to mainstream diplomacy. PR support and mediation offered by struc-
tures linked to the ROC and Patriarch Kirill add credibility to the intentions of 
Russia as an ally in the struggle for defending the Christian values, traditional 
sexuality and life in the international arena, thus creating favourable condi-
tions for Russia in forging political alliances.
The organisations which are active in this area include the missionary and 
cultural Saint Andrew’s Foundation (Фонд Андрея Первозванного58) and the 
international network organisation World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civili-
sations’ (Мировой общественный форум Диалог цивилизаций59) registered in 
Geneva, whose promoter is Vladimir Yakunin, an oligarch who has close links 
with Vladimir Putin. Other individuals engaged in this kind of activity are oli-
garch Konstantin Malofeev and Aleksandr Dugin, the supporter of the idea of 
Eurasianism, who has extensive connections among European conservatives 
who are favourably disposed to the Kremlin60. The most tangible effects of the 
operation of these structures included the statement by the Czech president 
Miloš Zeman, who appealed during the Dialogue of Civilisations forum in De-
cember 2014, for lifting the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia as a result 
of the Ukrainian conflict, thus attempting to undermine the solidarity of EU 
member states as regards this issue61. The circle of the ROC’s ‘friends’ also in-
cludes representatives of radical right circles in Europe, above all the National 
Front in France.
Furthermore, the conflict in Ukraine has given rise to many questions about the 
connection between Roc and Russian secret services which might operate in 
neighbouring countries. As reported by the former separatist leader Igor Girkin 
58 The organisation’s profile on Moscow Patriarchate’s website: http://www.patriarchia.ru/
db/text/441404.html
59 The organisation’s website http://dofc-foundation.org/ru/about
60 In 2014, hackers revealed the so-called ‘friends of Russia’ list made by Dugin’s assistant. 
Representatives of political and business elites and the media from a number of European 
countries, including Hungary’s president, Viktor Orban and the leader of the Hungarian 
right-wing party Jobbik, Gabor Vona, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and the former 
Romanian president, Ion Iliescu, were on this list.
61 For more information see: President Zeman calls for lifting of Russia sanctions at event or-
ganized by Putin associate, 19 September 2014,
http://radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/president-zeman-calls-for-lifting-of-russia-sanctions-
at-event-organized-by-putin-associate 
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(Strelkov), he came to Crimea towards the end of January 2014 before the Rus-
sian annexation of the peninsula as an official member of the ROC’s delegation, 
who were on a pilgrimage with Orthodox relics from Mount Athos, the so-called 
Gifts of the Wise Men62. Another participant of this pilgrimage was Konstantin 
Malofeev, the founder of the Orthodox Charity Foundation of Saint Basil the 
Great (Благотворительный фонд Святителя Василия Великого), which was 
one of the initiators of this pilgrimage and at the same time one of the sponsors 
of the Russian Russkiy Mir Foundation, tasked with promoting the Russian 
language outside Russia and which is especially active in the post-Soviet area. 
Malofeev has admitted in public that he organises and finances aid for pro-
Russian separatists in Ukraine.
2. the Russian orthodox church as a beneficiary of relations  
with the Kremlin
The Church’s strong social and institutional position is to a great extent a re-
sult of co-operation with the government in the areas mentioned above. Thus 
it is possible to propose the thesis that the increasing popularity of Orthodoxy 
among the public and the Church’s institutional ‘revival’ would not have been 
possible without the favourable approach and financial, organisational and me-
dia support from the Kremlin. Therefore, it is in the ROC’s interest to maintain 
this close co-operation which has brought it tangible benefits so far.
Firstly, good contacts with the state government guarantees the ROC a privi-
leged position among all other religious groups in Russia itself. At present, 
the ROC is clearly favoured by the Russian government as a religious organi-
sation representing the ‘Orthodox majority’ in society. Manifestations of this 
include broad access to the public media, education system, state institutions 
and sources of funds from the public budget. However, according to the provi-
sions of the constitution of the Russian Federation, Russia is a secular country 
which guarantees freedom of conscience and religion to its citizens63. In turn, 
as many as four confessions are recognised as ‘traditional’ in Russia. These are, 
along with Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. However, the widespread 
presence of the Orthodox Church in the Russian public space creates the im-
pression that Orthodoxy has the status of state religion in Russia. This belief is 
expressed by some Russians: according to public opinion polls, 46% of citizens 
62 Interview with Strelkov of 11 November 2014: http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/
63 See: Chapter 2. Article 28 of the constitution of the Russian Federation, http://www.consti-
tution.ru/10003000/10003000-4.htm
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are of the opinion that there is a state religion in Russia, and 44% are convinced 
that this religion is Orthodoxy64.
Given the ‘unequal competition’, representatives of other confessions complain 
that they are discriminated against by the state government, and accuse the 
ROC of taking a non-ecumenical stance and of contributing to building a nega-
tive image of the ‘competitive’ religions among the Russian public. The ROC 
is distrustful towards islam, the second largest religious community in Rus-
sia. According to various estimates, Muslims account for between 7% and 20% 
of Russian residents, and the popularity of this religion is rapidly growing65. 
The Church defends its predominant position in society, and the state aids it in 
this, for example by passing administrative decisions concerning allotment of 
plots for the construction of temples. As a consequence, while representatives 
of the Russian Council of Muftis have for years made unsuccessful attempts to 
receive consent to build another mosque in Moscow66, new Orthodox temples 
are built there on a mass scale. The struggle to maintain the dominant position 
also has an ideological aspect – for example, a ‘Declaration of Russian identity’ 
has been prepared under the patronage of the Orthodox Church. According to 
this declaration, the Orthodox religion is the basis of every Russian’s national 
identity67, which has sparked controversies among the followers of other reli-
gions. Yet on the other hand, depending on the political situation inside Russia, 
representatives of the Church would sometimes treat followers of Islam, which 
has traditionally been present in Russia, as tactical allies. One proof of this is 
Vsevolod Chaplin’s statement concerning a polygamous marriage in Chechnya, 
which was given a great deal of publicity in the media68; such marriages are 
64 WCIOM survey: http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114598 
65 According to public opinion polls, around 7% of Russia’s residents declare they are followers 
of Islam; in 2009, there were 4% of them. Experts’ estimates are much higher, reaching even 
up to 20% of the public. It is difficult to determine the precise data. The Muslim community 
in Russia comprises not only the people living in Russia whose traditional religion is Is-
lam but also migrant e workers from Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Thus Russia 
is a country with the largest Muslim community in Europe. However, this community is 
poorly organised and fragmented, considering the various denominations of Islam present 
there. 
66 Officially, four mosques operate in Moscow, while the estimated size of the Muslim com-
munity in this city is 2 million people. 
67 This declaration was adopted on 1 November 2014 at the time of the meeting of the 18th Glo-
bal Russian National Council; for more information see: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/
text/508347.html
68 This concerned the wedding of a senior Chechen state official with a minor girl in May 2015, 
which was publicised by Novaya Gazeta, for more information see: http://echo.msk.ru/
blog/kavkaz_politic/1550284-echo/
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admissible under Islam. The hierarch spoke in defence of this custom, conclud-
ing that Chechnya had fallen victim to opponents of the traditional family who 
want the nation’s traditions and identity to be eradicated so that it could be 
easier to control this nation for political purposes. This was in line with the 
opinions previously expressed by representatives of the ROC and the Kremlin 
that Russia itself is under attack from the amoral and secularised West.
The ROC is ill-disposed towards the catholic church and has been making 
attempts to restrain its missionary activity in Russia. Catholics have been 
accused of proselytism69, i.e. winning over followers in the areas recognised by 
the ROC as its ‘canonical territory’70. This is one of the reasons why the Russian 
Church has not granted consent for any pope to visit Russia as yet, even though 
the Vatican has come up with such proposals. The government in the Kremlin 
accepts this stance of the ROC, since it itself is suspicious about representatives 
of the religions popular in the West, such as Catholicism or Protestantism, sus-
pecting them of acting in the interest of foreign countries.
Legislative changes introduced under the influence of lobbying from the ROC 
and politicians linked to it have contributed to strengthening the Roc’s infra-
structure and possessions. The ROC has become the key beneficiary of the act 
adopted in 2010 enabling religious organisations to regain the assets lost after 
1917, which gave it the right to objects of religious cult – temples, monastery and 
utility buildings owned by the Church before the revolution, when the Orthodox 
Church was not formally separated from the state. Representatives of the state 
administration have commented that the act will allow the Church to reclaim 
as many as 12,000 historic premises. If this happened, the ROC would become 
one of the largest property owners in Russia. The Land Code of the Russian Fed-
eration was amended in March 2015. These amendments are beneficial to the 
Church since they offer the ROC more extensive rights to use state-owned land 
free of charge. As stated in a comment on the Moscow Patriarchate’s website, 
69 The Catholic Church in Russia itself is not a serious competitor for the ROC. The estimated 
size of the Catholic community in this country is several hundred thousand followers and 
around 230 parishes.
70 One proof of this was the ROC’s very sharp reaction to the Catholic Church’s changing 
the status of apostolic administrations in Russia to that of dioceses (which took place in 
2002). In 2007, Kirill while referring to this fact stated: “We will never agree, and we will 
not stop our protest against the presence of the regular dioceses of the Catholic Church 
in Russia. We believe that this is a challenge to our commonly shared principle of terri-
torial jurisdiction of Churches.” For more information see: http://www.interfax-religion.
ru/?act=news&div=21715
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representatives of the synodal department for co-operation with the public took 
part in the work on the bill71.
The government actively supports the Church in the development of church 
infrastructure by allocating land and financing the construction of new tem-
ples. One example of this is the implementation of the programme envisaging 
the construction of new temples in Moscow, known as ‘Project 200’72, which 
is being carried out in co-operation with the municipal government. In 2014, 
regardless of protests from some residents of Moscow, the number of planned 
investments was increased to 38073. The construction of Church infrastructure 
is also backed by sponsors from business circles – some Russian companies have 
special funds allocated for reconstruction of temples, which sometimes is due to 
close personal contacts between the Orthodox clergy and business representa-
tives. As a result, the ROC’s possessions have grown significantly over the past 
few years. However, it is difficult to assess the total value of the Church’s assets, 
since consolidated data are not made available to the public. Furthermore, the 
ROC’s assets also include incomes generated by business organisations linked 
to it (for example, Sofrino candle and jewellery factories, the manufacturer 
of ‘Holy Spring’ mineral water and the banks Sofrino and Peresvet linked to 
Church organisations).
The Church’s co-operation with the Kremlin also brings results in the area of 
education. After years of efforts, in 2012, the Russian government introduced 
obligatory religion lessons to primary schools. However, from the point of 
view of the Church, the main lobbyist behind this decision, the success has 
turned out to be partial. Orthodoxy (and more precisely, ‘Basics of the Orthodox 
culture’) became one of the five subjects to choose from as part of the compul-
sory course ‘Basics of the spiritual and moral culture of the peoples of Russia’, 
which has been launched in several regions of Russia since 2006 as a pilot pro-
gramme. When the programme covered all regions, it turned out that the public 
is interested in Orthodoxy to a smaller extent than expected – only 30% of Rus-
sian students chose the subject. The students could also choose secular ethics.
Nevertheless, positive relations with the state administration have made 
it possible for the Church to actively participate in the Russian education 
71 Commentary of 24 December 2014; http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3889996.html
72 This plan envisages the construction of 200 Orthodox temples in Moscow on plots of land 
provided by the city government. Project website: http://www.200hramov.ru/ 
73 For more information see: http://itar-tass.com/obschestvo/1388536
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system on all levels – nurseries, kindergartens and schools operate in some 
Orthodox parishes. Over the past few years, the Church has also been able 
to expand its educational offer for young people without any obstructions, 
boosting the educational potential of Orthodox higher education facilities 
and theological seminaries. At present, the ROC runs one university, five 
theological academies and fifty seminaries74. Since the 1990s, the ROC has 
also been actively developing co-operation with various kinds of Orthodox 
youth organisations operating in and outside Russia, which is stimulated 
by the government, for example through offering state grants for NGOs to 
these organisations.
Since Kirill’s rise to the patriarchal throne, the Church has been expanding 
its access to various social groups, organisations and institutions, and its 
hierarchs have become present in the public space expressing their opinions in 
the public debate on important social issues, for example speaking out against 
abortion. The patriarch raised this topic in his first official speech in front of 
deputies at the State Duma (lower house of Russian parliament) in January 2015, 
appealing at the same time that the state should discontinue financing abortion 
in the frame of medical insurance. At present, the ROC runs around 60 centres 
for supporting motherhood and preventing abortion, and intends to open new 
ones75. Another example of the ROC’s activity in the social area are its actions 
aimed at assimilation of immigrants. The first assimilation centre for expa-
triate workers was opened in 2012 in Moscow76. However, this idea has been 
widely criticised due to the fact that most migrant workers coming to Russia 
are Muslims.
An important fact is that over the past few years, thanks to closer co-operation 
with the Kremlin, the Church has increased its presence in state institutions 
– in the army and secret services; and its presence in various kinds of pub-
lic utility institutions, hospitals, airports, offices, has become commonplace. 
In 2009, following instructions from the president of Russia, the Ministry of 
Defence of the Russian Federation created a directorate for religious soldiers 
and made the function of Orthodox military chaplain more widespread. The 
construction of an Orthodox temple at the FSB Academy in Moscow, which 
was finalised in 2014 (as part of ‘Programme 200’), served as a symbol of closer 
74 Data quoted by the patriarch in 2011; http://ria.ru/society/20111114/488790378.html
75 For more information see: http://rusk.ru/fsvod.php?date=2014-08-12
76 For more information see: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2267669.html
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co-operation between the ROC and the secret services77. Temples and chapels 
can now be found in some hospitals, airports and penitentiary institutions.
Russian-language traditional and electronic media have become an impor-
tant instrument of popularising Orthodoxy and building the ROC’s positive im-
age in the eyes of the public. Since the 1990s, the Church has been successively 
increasing its presence in the media sphere, stemming partly from its good 
contacts with the Kremlin, which holds a tight grip on the media in Russia (one 
proof of this is the fact that opposition media have been ousted from the public 
arena and have faced repressions in Russia). Since Kirill’s rise to the patriarchal 
throne, the ROC’s presence has remained at a constant high level. The ‘Shep-
herd’s Word’ show hosted by the patriarch, which is broadcast by the Kremlin-
controlled Programme 1 TV station, and the publicist programme ‘The Church 
and the world’, hosted by Metropolitan Hilarion, have played an important role 
in reaching the broader public. Several Russian-language TV channels devoted 
to Orthodoxy, for example the television stations Spas78, Soyuz79 and Radonezh80 
are available on digital platforms and on the Internet. Over the past few years, 
the Church has also been intensively developing its activity in the Internet – via 
the official portals, for example, Patriarchia.ru and news platforms, for exam-
ple, Pravoslavie i Mir (pravmir.ru) and Portal-credo.ru, as well as Orthodox 
social networks, such as Elitsy81 and Ekklezia82.
the Roc’s activity as a publisher is also rapidly developing. A rich collection 
of Orthodox literature is available primarily in Church kiosks but also in normal 
bookshops. The book Everyday Saints and Other Stories by Archimandrite Tikhon 
(Shevkunov), telling about the life and the dilemmas of a clergyman, was a best-
seller in Russia in 201183. Media speculation that the author is President Putin’s 
confessor and a possible successor to the present patriarch adds popularity to 
this publication.
77 The construction of the temple symbolically ended on 20 December, the secret service work-
er’s day in Russia. For more information see: http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/1476805/
78 www.spastv.ru
79 www.tv-soyuz.ru
80 This is a TV channel, a radio and a news platform; radonezh.ru/tv
81 https://elitsy.ru/
82 http://ekklezia.ru/
83 This book became a bestseller in Russia (over one million copies were sold) and won a few 
prestigious publishing awards. 
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3. the Russian orthodox church as a hostage to relations  
with the Kremlin
The co-operation of the ‘altar and the throne’ in Russia, in addition to numer-
ous benefits, is also a source of some limitations to the Church, and is making 
it a hostage to relations with the Kremlin. This is not a co-operation between 
equal partners – the church is the subordinate partner. It is the Kremlin 
that determines the areas and the limits of co-operation. The Kremlin, which 
is increasingly distrustful of any independent initiatives and social organisa-
tions, especially those which have a good chance of winning broad public sup-
port, wants to tighten its grip on the ROC and has been thwarting its hierarchs’ 
attempts to emancipate themselves. From the government’s point of view, only 
a subordinated and predictable Church can be a safe ally. Furthermore, the 
Church’s abilities to influence the state’s decisions are limited, and the success-
fulness of its lobbying is correlated with the Kremlin’s interests.
The Church is not always able to bring about all the legislative changes ben-
eficial to it – as was the case with the compulsory Orthodox religion lessons 
for all students. As pointed out above, Orthodoxy has become only one of the 
five modules to be chosen from as part of a compulsory subject. Another proof 
that the Church has a limited influence on the administration is the fact that 
a court dismissed the charges against the director who staged a play based on 
Wagner’s Tannhauser in Novosibirsk Opera and Ballet Theatre that had been 
criticised by the clergy. The local metropolitan accused the director of insult-
ing religious feelings, which is a punishable offence in Russia. This conflict 
resounded widely across Russia and provoked city residents’ protests against 
‘Orthodox radicalism’84.
The Kremlin has proven that it is able to control the ROC’s actions and disci-
pline its hierarchs in case they made attempts to undermine the government’s 
reputation or to become overly emancipated. According to media speculations, 
the fact that the property scandals85 in which the patriarch was involved were 
made public was the Kremlin’s attempt to discipline the ROC’s primate. At 
that time his public support ratings were very high. The government prob-
ably did not like the fact that Kirill had begun to make attempts to strengthen 
his public image (for example, in his first reaction to anti-Putin protests in 
84 2,500 people took part in the protest in Novosibirsk on 5 April 2015. For more information 
see: http://grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.239810.html
85 See footnote 30.
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late 2011/early 2012, he spoke with sympathy about the protesters and appealed 
to the government to listen carefully to their demands) and demonstrated 
overly high political ambitions.
The special character of relations with the Kremlin means that the Church 
hierarchs must withdraw from activity in certain areas which are important 
from the point of view of development of society and the state, for example, co-
operation with representatives of the anti-Kremlin opposition or actions aimed 
at popularising democratic freedoms in Russia, which might provoke the gov-
ernment’s dissatisfaction. One proof of this is the dismissal of Deacon Kuraev, 
who openly criticised the Church for its engagement in politics and accused the 
Russian government of authoritarianism86. Furthermore, as it appears now, 
the Church has given up its attempts to conduct its own policies that would be 
in conflict with the interests of the state. For example, Patriarch Kirill did not 
criticise the government for the annexation of Crimea and waging the war on 
Ukraine although these decisions have put the ROC in a very difficult situation, 
given the large number of its followers in Ukraine87. Over the past few years, 
the Church has also given up a separate historical policy that would bring into 
account those responsible for Stalinist crimes and highlight the harm the com-
munist government inflicted on the Church88. This policy would have collided 
with the new state ideology being launched by the Kremlin, one element of 
which is promoting a vision of the country’s history without any contradictions 
or unambiguously negative evaluations of the era of communist rule89.
The long-term negative consequences of the Church’s close contacts with the 
Kremlin include reputational losses the Church has already begun to sustain. 
86 See footnote 45.
87 For more information on the ROC’s response to the Ukrainian conflict see: Katarzyna 
Chawryło (Jarzyńska), Patriarch Kirill’s game over Ukraine, OSW Commentary, 14 August 
2014; http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-08-14/patriarch-
kirills-game-over-ukraine
88 In 2011, when signs of a trend to condemn totalitarianism appeared in the Kremlin’s histori-
cal policy, the Church unambiguously backed in public discussions the idea to commemo-
rate the victims of the totalitarian regime. The ROC’s representative, Vsevolod Chaplin, 
commented then: “It is necessary to make a political and legal evaluation of the crimes com-
mitted by the Bolshevik regime. The crimes committed not only by Stalin but also by Lenin, 
Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky.” He also said that the glorification of executioners, i.e. naming 
streets after them, needed to be stopped. For more information see: http://www.newsru.
com/arch/religy/18apr2011/politik.html
89 For more information see: Witold Rodkiewicz, Jadwiga Rogoża: Potemkin conservatism…, 
op. cit.
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As the Church is becoming more active in politics, the number of citizens who 
do not want the Church to be engaged in political issues has risen. What also 
discourages part of the Russian public is the activity of radical social organisa-
tions of an Orthodox and nationalist profile which identify themselves with the 
Orthodox Church and fanatically support President Putin. These controversial 
organisations include the Association of Orthodox Experts90, which propagates 
imperialist and anti-Ukrainian views, and the movement God’s Will, whose 
leader, Dmitry Enteo, became known for organising a conference concerning 
the ‘godly’ nature of President Putin91.
In turn, the ROC’s reputation on the international arena has suffered from its 
stance on the conflict in Ukraine. Patriarch Kirill has never condemned in pub-
lic the Kremlin’s aggressive policy, as a consequence of which some members 
of the Orthodox Church outside Russia are turning their backs on the Moscow 
Patriarchate, treating it as an ‘aggressor’92.
90 An organisation which wants, for example, Russian troops to officially enter Ukraine and 
Ukraine’s total subordination to Russia.
91 For more information see: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=news&id=109315
92 For more information on the patriarch’s attitude to the conflict in Ukraine see: Katarzyna 
Chawryło (Jarzyńska), Patriarch Kirill’s game over Ukraine, op. cit.
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iv. the challenges the Russian oRthodox chuRch 
is Facing
One serious challenge the Russian Orthodox Church may face in the future is 
the fact that even though it has been undergoing an institutional and financial 
revival over the past few years, it has been unable to attract followers to the 
churches on a massive scale. Furthermore, given the demographic crisis Rus-
sia is experiencing, the risk is that the Church will lose some active members 
as the elder generations will die out. Moreover, as a consequence of migration 
processes, the proportion of Orthodox Christians in Russian society will dimin-
ish – the majority of immigrants coming to Russia are Muslims. As a result, the 
currently observed discrepancy between the presumed and the real number 
of active followers may lead to a weakening of the church’s negotiating po-
sition in relations with the Russian government and a decline in its previous 
privileges. The number of Orthodoxy followers may also fall due to the Church’s 
engagement in politics, which discourages some active members from partici-
pating in the Church’s life at present. As proven by the developments witnessed 
over the past few years, the ROC’s approach, which is not amenable to criticism 
and dialogue, prevents it from improving its image among the social groups who 
criticise it most of all.
Over the past few years, the Russian Orthodox Church has blended into 
the Russian government system and become engaged in politics to an 
increasing extent, going beyond the traditional areas of activity reserved for 
religious organisations, such as catechisation and charity. Given the Russian 
political reality, where the government more and more tends towards au-
thoritarianism, and the space for independent social initiatives is gradually 
shrinking, co-operation and subordination is the most convenient way for 
the Church to achieve its own goals. For the time being, as it seems, for the 
Russian Orthodox Church the benefits of this co-operation are much higher 
than the losses, and this is an argument for strengthening mutual relations. 
However, as the Ukrainian conflict has revealed, a further reconciliation 
of close relations with the Kremlin with the interests of the Church itself 
will depend on the ROC’s readiness to surrender what has remained of its 
autonomy.
Although the Russian Orthodox Church benefits substantially from its co-
operation with the Kremlin, it also assumes some risk, since it becomes vul-
nerable to the disturbances the government system created by Putin may face 
in the future. Accumulating problems, resulting partly from the country’s 
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disadvantageous economic situation, which may lead to the deterioration of 
the living standards of citizens and growing dissatisfaction among part of the 
business and political elite, may also affect the stability and well-being of the 
Church and its hierarchs.
Work on this text was completed in July 2015
KataRzyna chawRyło
